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Abstract
In an infinitely-lived framework, taxing capital income may be growth and welfare
enhancing when it allows for correcting distorting externalities in the competitive
equilibrium allocation. This is the case when public capital is subject to congestion
by private capital or total income [Fisher and Turnovsky (1998)] or when govern-
ment expenditure exerts an external eﬀect on physical capital [Corsetti and Roubini
(1996)]. However, none of these features appear in simple one-sector endogenous
growth models with public capital. Alternatively, we consider certain realistic fiscal
policy constraints in a simple one-sector growth model with productive and unpro-
ductive public expenditures, to show that raising revenues through factor income
taxes may be preferred to using lump-sum taxes.
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1. Introduction
How should public expenses be financed? Should existing tax systems be reorganized and
income taxes be substituted by less distorting taxes? How high should public investment
be as a percentage of GNP? Issues like these, regarding the eﬀects of fiscal policy on
growth and welfare, have been widely debated in the public finance literature. Most work
has focused on the incidence of a second-best tax structure in dynamic settings, in the line
of the seminal paper by Ramsey (1927). Along this line, pioneer work by Judd (1985),
Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) emphasized the negative incidence of capital income
taxes on welfare in general equilibrium models. Judd (1999) argued for a zero tax rate on
physical and human capital income in the long-run. Jones et al. (1997) and Milesi-Ferretti
and Roubini (1998) extended the zero tax rate result to labor and consumption taxes in
models with human capital, although pointing out that certain public revenue constraints
could imply that taxing productive factors positively in the long-run might be optimal in
a second-best sense. Nevertheless, the general presumption drawn from previous work is
that raising revenues through lump-sum taxes is more favorable to welfare than taxing
income from productive factors.
A parallel renewed line of research emerged with Barro (1990), who combined the
public finance literature, the study of productive public expenditures and the endogenous
growth literature.1 Among others, Futagami et al. (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994)
and Turnovsky (1996, 2000) are extended versions of Barro (1990). In them, public
revenues come from proportional income taxes and the government chooses the welfare-
maximizing ratio of productive public expenditures-to-output. However, in that setting,
not much work has been done regarding the optimal simultaneous choice of a productive
public expenditure/output ratio and a financing rule.2 In this paper, we aim to make some
progress along this line. In a Barro-type setting we characterize the welfare-maximizing
productive public expenditure/output ratio under alternative tax scenarios, which are, for
the sake of simplicity, those considered in Fisher and Turnovsky (1998): (i) a distortionary
tax on total income and (ii) a lump-sum tax, in both cases with a period-by-period
balanced budget. We find that, under certain realistic fiscal policy constraints, raising
revenues through taxes on total income might be a preferred strategy to raising revenues
through lump-sum taxation.
An argument in favor of taxing in a distorting fashion arises from distributive consid-
erations. Generally, the positive eﬀect of income distribution between generations makes
a zero tax rate on capital income not to be optimal: see Jones and Manuelli (1992) in an
overlapping generations setting with production, and Caballé (1998) in an infinitely-lived
framework with altruistic preferences. Alternatively, in an infinitely-lived framework, dis-
torting taxation may become optimal when the competitive equilibrium allocation involves
a harmful externality that could be corrected, at least partially, by taxing factors income.
1Empirical work by Ratner (1983), Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) emphasizes the positive link
between public expenses and the private production process.
2Exceptions are, among others, Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) in a neoclassical growth model and
Corsetti and Roubini (1996) in a two-sector endogenous growth setting.
2
For example, Chamley (2001) shows that borrowing constraints may induce individuals
to over-accumulate capital in the long-run when insuring against idiosyncratic shocks.
In models with public capital, productive public expenditures are sometimes assumed to
exert a positive external eﬀect on physical capital [as in Corsetti and Roubini (1996)],
while private capital over-congests public capital in competitive equilibrium in Fisher and
Turnovsky (1998). In these environments, taxing capital income in the long-run would be
optimum, since otherwise physical capital would over-accumulate in competitive equilib-
rium.
In this paper we consider more fundamental reasons for distorting taxes to be a
preferred revenue raising strategy in a one-sector endogenous growth model with non-
congested public capital. An explicit fiscal policy constraint is assumed,3 in the form of
a constant unproductive public expenditure/output ratio (i.e., due to ineﬃcient bureau-
cratic or administrative costs, or to the payment of interest on outstanding debt), which
will limit the choice of the productive public investment/output ratio when maximizing
growth or welfare. In a Barro-type setting, a tax increase can be used to finance a higher
level of productive public expenditures, which has a direct and positive impact on growth
and welfare. If the source of revenues is income taxes, private capital accumulation is
discouraged, and the positive eﬀect on growth and welfare of the increase in productive
public expenditures is partly neutralized. On the other hand, although lump-sum tax
financing is not harmful for private capital accumulation, private consumption will be
strongly aﬀected, since it will experience most of the implied crowding-out eﬀect.
Therefore, choosing between distorting and non-distorting taxes represents a trade-
oﬀ between current and future consumption. Discouraging private capital accumulation,
distorting taxes have a long-run eﬀect on future growth and consumption. Alternatively,
taxing lump-sum has a strong short-run eﬀect on consumption, with no disincentive on
private capital accumulation. Which tax system is preferred will depend on the relative
size of both eﬀects on welfare. What is specific to our model is that financing unpro-
ductive expenditures through lump-sum taxes produces a strong crowding-out impact on
current consumption which may sharply reduce the possibilities for public investment.
This distorts the accumulation of public capital, relative to private capital, limiting the
growth stimulus achievable through public investment. It turns out that this restriction
can be more damaging for growth and welfare than the disincentive created on private
capital accumulation when taxing productive factors’ income.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic framework is described. In
section 3 the competitive equilibrium and the long-run equilibrium path are characterized.
In sections 4 the growth- and welfare-maximizing public investment policies under income
and lump-sum taxes are compared, and a simple numerical example is presented. Finally,
section 5 ends with main conclusions and extensions.
3The fiscal policy rigidity is “based on informational and political constraints which are not explicitly
modeled” [Jones et al. (1997)].
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2. A basic framework for analysis
The model draws on work by Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) and Glomm and
Ravikumar (1994). It diﬀers from the non-congested version in the Glomm-Ravikumar
setting because of the presence of an spillover factor in production and the fact that not all
public expenditure is productive. The economy consists of a continuum of firms indexed
by [0,1], a fiscal authority and a representative household.
2.1. Firms
Firms are identical, rent the same amount of physical capital kt and labor lt from house-
holds, and produce yt units of the consumption commodity at a given period t. The
capital stock used in the aggregate by all firms, Kt, is taken as a proxy for the index of
knowledge available to each single firm [as in Romer (1986)]. Additionally, public capital,
Kgt , is exogenous to the private production process and aﬀects all individual firms in the
same way. Except for these externalities, the private production technology can be rep-
resented by a standard Cobb-Douglas function presenting constant returns to scale. For
any firm,
yt = F (lt, kt, Kt,K
g
t ) = zl1−αt kαt K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ , α, θ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ [0, 1], (2.1)
where α is the share of private capital in output, θ and φ are the constant elasticities of
output with respect to public capital and the knowledge index, and z is a technological
scale.
Since all firms are identical, we can aggregate on (2.1), to obtain total output in the
economy, Yt,
Yt = zL1−αt K
(α+φ+θ)
t
µ
Kgt
Kt
¶θ
, (2.2)
where Lt, Kt are the total amounts of labor and physical capital used by all the firms in
the economy. During period t, each firm pays the competitive-determined wage wt on the
labor it hires and the rate rt on the capital it rents. The profit maximizing problem of
the typical firm turns out to be static,
Max
{lt,kt}
F (lt, kt,Kt, K
g
t )− wtlt − rtkt,
leading to the usual marginal product conditions,
rt = Fkt = αzl1−αt kα−1t K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ = α
yt
kt
= α
Yt
Kt
, (2.3)
wt = Flt = (1− α)zl−αt kαt K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ = (1− α)yt
lt
= (1− α)Yt
Lt
, (2.4)
where we have used the fact that each firm treats its own contribution to the aggregate
capital stock as given. From these optimality conditions we have the standard result on
income distribution,
rtKt + wtLt = Yt. (2.5)
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2.2. The public sector
The public sector collects taxes to finance its expenditures, which are distributed between
public investment, Igt , and public services, C
g
t , the latter not entering as an argument in
consumers’ utility or in the production function, but being required for the public sector
to exist. The government is assumed to follow a policy that maintains constant ratios, κi
and κc, of both types of public expenditures to total output,
Igt = κiYt, κi ≥ 0, (2.6)
Cgt = κcYt, κi ≥ 0, (2.7)
with κi + κc < 1. Public capital accumulates according to,
Kgt+1 = I
g
t + (1− δg)Kgt . (2.8)
Tax revenues finance total public expenses every period. Two alternative tax scenarios
are considered [as in Fisher and Turnovsky (1998)]: (i) a distorting taxation scheme, where
total income is taxed at a rate τ t, while transfers, Xt, are zero, with a government budget
constraint,
Igt + C
g
t = τ tYt, (2.9)
and (ii) a non-distorting tax scenario, with τ t = 0, and the government financing its
expenditures through lump-sum taxes,
Igt + C
g
t = Xt. (2.10)
2.3. Households
We assume zero population growth and normalize population size to one. The repre-
sentative consumer is the owner of physical capital, and allocates her resources between
consumption, Ct, and investment in physical capital, It. Private physical capital accumu-
lates over time according to,
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt, (2.11)
and decisions are made each period to maximize the discounted aggregate value of the
time separable, logarithmic utility function
Max
{Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βt ln(Ct), (2.12)
subject to the resource constraint,
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt ≤ (1− τ t)(wtLt + rtKt), (2.13)
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under income taxes and
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Xt ≤ wtLt + rtKt, (2.14)
under lump-sum taxes. Kt+1 denotes the stock of physical capital at the end of time t,
with K0 > 0, and β is the discount factor, between zero and one.
The consumer takes fiscal policy and factor prices as given when deciding how to split
her current income between consumption and savings. When the government finances its
operations through income taxes, the optimality condition for the consumer is
Ct+1
Ct
= β [(1− δ) + (1− τ t)rt] , (2.15)
while in the case of lump-sum taxation, the optimality condition becomes,
Ct+1
Ct
= β [(1− δ) + rt] (2.16)
together with the budget constraint, either (2.13) or (2.14), the transversality condition,
lim
t→∞
βtKt+1
∂U
∂Ct
≡ lim
t→∞
βtKt+1
1
Ct
= 0, (2.17)
and Kt+1 ≥ 0, Ct ≥ 0, for any period t.
3. Equilibrium conditions and the balanced growth path
3.1. The competitive equilibrium
A particular fiscal policy π is characterized by two parameter values, κi, κc, and two
time sequences, {τ t, Xt}∞t=0. Following Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), we define a π-
competitive equilibrium (π-CE):
Definition 1. Given initial conditions K0, K
g
0 > 0, a π-CE for the overall economy is a
set of allocations
©
Ct, C
g
t , Kt+1, K
g
t+1, It, I
g
t , Lt, Yt
ª∞
t=0
, a set of prices {rt, wt}∞t=0 and a fiscal
policy π, such that, given {rt, wt}∞t=0: (i) {Lt,Kt+1}∞t=0 solve the profit maximizing problem
of firms [i.e., (2.3)-(2.4) hold], (ii) {Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0 maximize the utility of households [i.e.,
(2.17), Ct,Kt+1 ≥ 0 and either (2.13) and (2.15) under income taxes or (2.14) and (2.16)
under lump-sum taxes hold], (iii) the public sector budget constraint [either (2.9) or
(2.10)], together with (2.6), (2.7) and the technology constraints (2.2), (2.11), (2.8) hold
and (iv) markets clear every period:
Lt = 1, (3.1)
Yt = Ct + C
g
t + It + I
g
t . (3.2)
In fact, marginal utility at the origin equal to infinity guarantees that strict inequalities
will hold for Kt+1 > 0, Ct > 0 at all time periods, which we use in what follows.
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3.2. The balanced growth path
The balanced growth path is a π-CE trajectory along which aggregate variables grow at
a zero or positive constant rate. Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991) and Jones and Manuelli
(1997), among others, have shown that cumulative inputs must present constant returns
to scale in the private production process (i.e., α+θ+φ = 1) and rt must be constant and
high enough, for the equilibrium to display positive and steady growth in our Barro-type
setting. From now on, we will focus on the special case in which4 α+ θ + φ = 1.
Under these conditions, it is easy to show from the equilibrium conditions that Yt, Ct,
Kt, K
g
t , C
g
t and Xt must all grow at the same constant rate, denoted γ¯ hereinafter, along
the balanced growth path, while bounded variables, such as τ t and rt, must be constant.
Therefore, the ratios ct = Ct/Kt, k
g
t = K
g
t /Kt, yt = Yt/Kt, c
g
t = C
g
t /Kt and xt = Xt/Kt
are constant along the balanced growth path.
In terms of these ratios, π-CE conditions can be particularized for a balanced growth
path equilibrium to the following system in γ¯, c¯, k¯g, y¯, r¯, c¯g, x¯ and τ¯ (letters with bar
refer to values along the balanced growth path):
γ¯ + δ = (1− κi − κc)y¯ − c¯, (3.3)
γ¯ + δg = κiy¯(k¯g)−1, (3.4)
r¯ = αy¯, (3.5)
y¯ = z(k¯g)θ, (3.6)
c¯g = κcy¯, (3.7)
and either
x¯ = 0, (3.8)
τ¯ = κi + κc, (3.9)
1 + γ¯ = β [(1− δ) + (1− τ¯) r] , (3.10)
under income taxes, or
τ¯ = 0, (3.11)
x¯ = (κi + κc)y¯, (3.12)
1 + γ¯ = β(1− δ + r¯), (3.13)
under lump-sum taxes.
Condition (3.3) comes from the global constraint of resources, (3.4) is the public in-
vestment rule, (3.5) is the gross return on capital accumulation, (3.6) is the production
function, (3.7) is the public consumption rule and, depending on the tax system con-
sidered, either (3.10) or (3.13) refer to the intertemporal substitution of consumption
relationship and either (3.9) or (3.12) is the government budget constraint.
In parallel to Definition 1, for a particular stationary fiscal policy π¯ = {κi,κc, τ¯ , x¯},
the π¯-balanced growth path (π¯-BP ) is defined:
4The presence of the spillover eﬀect allows us to change the values of the α, θ parameters independently
from each other.
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Definition 2. A π¯-BP is a vector Π¯ = {γ¯, c¯, k¯g, y¯, r¯, c¯g} and a stationary fiscal policy π¯
satisfying: (3.3)-(3.7), either (3.8)-(3.10) under income taxes or (3.11)-(3.13) under lump-
sum taxes, the transversality condition (2.17) and non-negativity conditions c¯ > 0 and
k¯g > 0.
The common growth rate property allows us to write the balanced growth version of
the transversality condition (2.17) as, limt→∞ β
t (1 + γ¯) 1
c
= 0, which will be satisfied by
any π¯-BP .
3.3. The full depreciation π¯-BP
For simplicity, we initially assume that both types of capital fully depreciate each period,
so that δ = δg = 1 in (3.3)-(3.13). This assumption enable us to obtain an analytical char-
acterization of the π-CE and the π¯-BP allocations, so that our results can be compared
with those obtained in previous research.5
Proposition 1 shows the existence of a single π¯-BP under δ = δg = 1,6 provided that
κi and κc are such that a positive amount of resources is left to the consumer every
period.7
Proposition 1. If κi+κc < 1, there is a single π¯-BP under income taxes. Under lump-
sum taxes κi + κc < 1 − αβ is required for a π¯-BP to exist. Then, the π¯-BP is also
unique.
Proof. (i) Under income taxes, if κi + κc < 1, the set of equations (3.3)-(3.10), particu-
larized to the case of full depreciation, has a single solution,
k¯gd =
κi
αβ(1− κi − κc)
, (3.14)
r¯d = zα1−θ
·
κi
β(1− κi − κc)
¸θ
, (3.15)
γ¯d = zκθi [αβ(1− κi − κc)]
1−θ − 1, (3.16)
yd = z
·
κi
αβ(1− κi − κc)
¸θ
, (3.17)
c¯d = (1− κi − κc)1−θ(1− αβ)z
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
, (3.18)
c¯gd = κcz
·
κi
αβ(1− κi − κc)
¸θ
. (3.19)
5Together with the assumption that leisure does not enter in the utility function, which is of the
logarithmic type. In section 4, full depreciation is shown not to be crucial for the conclusions relating to
the growth-maximizing public expenditures policies, although it may be relevant for welfare analysis.
6In the Appendix (part 1), we show this statement for any δ, δg ∈ [0, 1].
7Hereinafter, a d-uppercase denotes a variable under distortionary taxation, while an n-uppercase
denotes the value of the variable under non-distortionary taxes.
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Since αβ < 1, it is clear that c¯d, k¯gd > 0, so the vector Π¯d = {γ¯d, c¯d, k¯gd, y¯d, r¯d, c¯gd} defined
by (3.14)-(3.19), will be a π¯-BP .
(ii) Similarly, under lump-sum taxes, combining (3.3)-(3.7) with (3.11)-(3.13) leads to,
k¯gn =
κi
αβ
, (3.20)
r¯n = zα1−θ
µ
κi
β
¶θ
, (3.21)
γ¯n = zκθi (αβ)
1−θ − 1, (3.22)
yn = z
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
, (3.23)
c¯n = z
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
[(1− κi − κc)− αβ] , (3.24)
c¯gn = κcz
µ
κi
αβ
¶θ
. (3.25)
Furthermore, c¯n, k¯gn > 0 so long as κi + κc < 1− αβ. Under that condition, the vector
Π¯n = {γ¯n, c¯n, k¯gn, y¯n, c¯gn, r¯n}, which is uniquely defined by conditions (3.20)-(3.25) above,
will be a π¯-BP
3.4. Characterizing the full depreciation π-CE
The simplicity of the model allows for the π-CE to be analytically characterized. Re-
garding the decision rules for Ct and Kt+1, we make a linear guess for their dependence
on output: Ct = aYt and Kt+1 = bYt. Under income taxes, taking these linear rules to:
(2.13), (2.15), (2.9), (2.6), (2.7), (2.3) together with Lt = 1, we get,
Cdt = [(1− αβ) (1− κi − κc)]z
³
Kgdt
´θ ¡
Kdt
¢1−θ
, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., (3.26)
Kdt+1 = αβ (κi + κc)z
³
Kgdt
´θ ¡
Kdt
¢1−θ
, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., (3.27)
while taking to (2.14), (2.16), (2.10), (2.6), (2.7) (2.3) the proposed linear rules for capital
and consumption, together with Lt = 1, under lump-sum taxes, we obtain,
Cnt = [(1− κi − κc)− αβ]z (K
g
t )
θ (Knt )
1−θ , t = 0, 1, 2, ..., (3.28)
Knt+1 = αβz (K
gn
t )
θ (Knt )
1−θ , t = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.29)
Finally, under both tax systems, combining (2.2), (2.6) and Lt = 1, we get
Kgt+1 = κiz (K
g
t )
θK1−θt , t = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.30)
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which is, under either tax system, a set of three equations characterizing the propagation
mechanism for Ct, Kt+1 and K
g
t+1 along a π-CE.
The characteristics of the dynamics of Ct, Kt+1 and K
g
t+1 are given by the eigenvalue
structure of the coeﬃcient matrix of the state-space representation of the system above,
in logs.8 Independently of the tax system, that matrix has a zero eigenvalue and a second
eigenvalue equal to one. The zero eigenvalue reflects the absence of transitional dynamics,
while the unit eigenvalue is inherent to sustained growth models,9 implying that the ratios
Kgt /Kt, Ct/Kt converge to constant levels, k¯
g and c¯. Since households face a convex control
problem, existence and uniqueness of the π-CE is guaranteed. Consequently, given K0,
Kg0 > 0, the previous system provides us with the values of C0, K1 and K
g
1 under either
tax policy, the three variables growing from that time on at the common rate γ¯ given by
(3.16) and (3.22).
4. Income versus lump-sum taxes
In this section, we discuss the possibility that the steady-state growth rate as well as
the level of welfare might be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes, when the
government chooses the public investment/output ratio, κi, to maximize either growth
or welfare. The government is assumed to be constrained by the need to finance a fixed
ratio of unproductive public expenses to output, κc ≥ 0. From Proposition 1, we already
know that any κc < 1 is feasible under income taxes, while κc < 1− αβ is the feasibility
condition under lump-sum taxes. Hence, we just consider parameterizations in
Ω ≡
©
ω = (κc,α, β, θ) ∈ <4 : α, β, θ ∈ (0, 1), α+ θ ≤ 1, κc ∈ [0, 1− αβ)
ª
.
4.1. Maximizing steady-state growth
In an economy without transitional dynamics, welfare is determined by the growth-rate
and the initial consumption level, so the influence of the steady-state growth rate on
welfare is obvious. We characterize in this section conditions under which a given tax
system produces higher growth, leaving the discussion on the implied welfare levels for
the next section. From (3.16), given a value of κc, γ¯ is strictly concave in κi, with an
interior maximum at
κd∗i = θ(1− κc), (4.1)
8Under either tax system, the state-space representation of the decision rules and policy function with
variables in logs [cˆ = ln(C), kˆ = ln(K), kˆg = ln(Kg)] is,
cˆt = d1 + θkˆgt + (1− θ) kˆt,µ
kˆgt+1
kˆt+1
¶
=
µ
d2
d3
¶
+
µ
θ 1− θ
θ 1− θ
¶µ
kˆgt
kˆt
¶
,
where d1, d2 and d3 are constants.
9See King and Rebelo (1988) and Caballé and Santos (1993).
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which gives us the growth-maximizing level10 of κi under income taxes.11 Condition (4.1)
includes as special cases the result in section I in Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994) and Futagami et al. (1993), who obtain κd∗i = θ when working with κc = 0.
Under lump-sum taxes, (3.22) shows that the steady-state growth rate γ¯ is monotoni-
cally increasing and concave in κi, the level of κi being bounded by
κn∗i = 1− κc − αβ. (4.2)
This upper bound on κi, which is inversely related to κc, α and β, restricts the choice set
of the government under lump-sum taxes.
Comparing (3.16) with (3.22), we see that the growth rate γ¯ will be strictly higher
under lump-sum than under income taxes for a common value of κi. This is due to the
disincentive eﬀect that a positive capital tax rate exerts on the accumulation of private
capital, relative to taxing lump-sum, when financing a given level of κi +κc. However, a
government interested in maximizing long-run growth would choose a productive public
investment ratio κd∗i under income taxes, choosing an investment ratio as close as possible
to κn∗i under lump-sum taxes.
Plugging (4.1), (4.2) in (3.16), (3.22), the implied growth rates, denoted by γ¯d∗ and
γ¯n∗, respectively, satisfy
1 + γd∗
1 + γn∗
=
µ
κd∗i
κn∗i
¶θ ¡
1− κd∗i − κc
¢1−θ
=
µ
θ
1− κc − αβ
¶θ
(1− κc) (1− θ)1−θ , (4.3)
which increases with κc for κc > 1− αβ1−θ . This is the same condition guaranteeing that
κd∗i > κn∗i , which emerges from (4.3) as a necessary condition for γd∗ > γn∗. Hence,
for suﬃciently high levels of the non-productive public expenditure ratio, any ordering
between the implied growth rates might arise, and Figure 4.1 shows that, indeed, growth
could be higher under distortionary taxes.
The relationship between growth rates can be written,
γ¯d∗ > γ¯n∗ ⇔ Ψ(ω) ≡ 1− βα
(1− κc)
n
1− θ [(1− κc)(1− θ)]
1−θ
θ
o < 0, (4.4)
with Ψ(ω) a function defined over Ω. For any given values of α, β, θ in Ω, Proposition
2 guarantees the existence of a single and positive level of κc, denoted by κγc , for which
Ψ (κγc ,α, β, θ) = 0 and γ¯d∗ = γ¯n∗. Values of κc above κγc will significantly reduce the
government’s choice set for κi under lump-sum taxes so that κn∗i will fall to the left of
A in Figure 4.1, making γ¯d∗ to be higher than γ¯n∗.12 Above κγc , the value of κc places an
10Along the paper, an asterisk denotes a value obtained under a growth-maximizing public investment
strategy.
11Condition (4.1) is equivalent to that in section IV of Barro (1990).
12In the non-congested Glomm-Ravikumar (1994) setting, where κc = 0, lump-sum taxes would always
produce faster growth than income taxes, a special case of our result.
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upper bound on the choice of productive public investment under lump-sum taxes which
is more damaging for growth than the distortion introduced by income taxes.
Finally, Corollary 1 shows that κγc is inversely related to α, β and θ. Therefore, in
a Barro-type setting, it is more likely that the maximum achievable growth rate will be
higher under income than under lump-sum taxes in economies with high values of the un-
productive public consumption/output ratio, high private and public capital productivity
(high α and θ) and where households weight heavily future consumption.
Proposition 2. There is a critical value of κc, 1 − αβ1−θ < κγc < 1 − αβ, above (below)
which the maximum achievable growth rate is higher (lower) under income than under
lump-sum taxes.
Proof. From the expression of Ψ(ω) in (4.4), it is easy to check that: (a) Ψ(ω) is
continuous on Ω; (b) for any given values of α, β, θ, Ψ
¡
κc = 1− αβ1−θ ,α,β, θ
¢
= 1 −
1−θµ
1−θ(αβ)
1−θ
θ
¶ > 0, while lim
κc→(1−αβ)−
Ψ(ω) = 1− 1
1−θ[αβ(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ
< 0; and (c) ∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc =
−βα 1−θ
(1−κc)2
1−[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ½
1−θ[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ
¾ < 0 on Ω. Therefore, there exists a single level of κc in£
1− αβ
1−θ , 1− αβ
¢
, κγc , such that Ψ(ω) < 0 if and only if κc > κγc . From (4.4), that implies
γ¯d∗ > γ¯n∗, the opposite being true if κc ≤ κγc
Corollary 1. κγc is inversely related to α, θ and β.
Proof. Ψ(ω) = 0 defines an implicit function which is {2 on Ω. Let us denote B =
(1− κc)
n
1− θ [(1− κc) (1− θ)]
1−θ
θ
o
> 0. From Proposition 2, ∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc < 0. Conse-
quently, by the implicit function theorem: (a) ∂κ
γ
c
∂α = −
∂Ψ(ω)/∂α
∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc < 0, since
∂Ψ(ω)
∂α =
−β
B
<
0; (b) ∂κ
γ
c
∂β = −
∂Ψ(ω)/∂β
∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc < 0, since
∂Ψ(ω)
∂β =
−α
B
< 0; and (c)∂κ
γ
c
∂θ = −
∂Ψ(ω)/∂θ
∂Ψ(ω)/∂κc < 0, since
∂Ψ(ω)
∂θ =
αβ[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ ln[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
(1−κc)θ
½
1−θ[(1−κc)(1−θ)]
1−θ
θ
¾2 , which is negative because ln [(1− κc) (1− θ)] < 0
Since the economy displays no transition, at t = 1 variables are already on their
balanced growth path, growing at the steady-state rate unless any policy or structural
change occurs. Given K0, K
g
0 , (3.27), (3.29) and (3.30) show that state variables at t = 1
under the growth-maximizing policies satisfy,
Kd∗1 /K
n∗
1 = κd∗i + κc = θ + (1− θ)κc < 1,
Kgd∗1 /K
gn∗
1 = κd∗i /κn∗i =
θ (1− κc)
1− κc − αβ
,
so that the disincentive created by income taxes leads to a private capital stock below
that accumulated under lump-sum taxes. The distortion on private capital accumulation
decreases for high values of κc, since the Kd∗1 /Kn∗1 -ratio depends positively on κc. On the
other hand, Kgd∗1 /K
gn∗
1 increases with κc and K
gd∗
1 > K
gn∗
1 for κc > 1 − αβ1−θ (i.e., when
κd∗i > κn∗i ). The economy reacts to taxes on private capital with higher public capital
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accumulation, and this shift of resources from private to public capital accumulation can
be enough to produce higher long-run growth.
The Kgd∗1 /K
gn∗
1 -ratio increases with β, α and θ and, additionally, the K
d∗
1 /K
n∗
1 -ratio
increases with θ, which explains the result in Corollary 1. The higher the output elastici-
ties of either type of capital, α, θ, the lower will be the loss of future resources produced by
distortionary taxation, so it will be more likely that this system produces higher growth.
Growth in this economy arises from the accumulation of both, private and public
capital. A higher preference for future utility increases the desire to save much more
under non-distortionary taxation since then, the return to private capital is not taxed.
Not leaving many resources for consumption, the government has a limit on their own
productive investment expenditures, which restricts the possibilities for future growth.
The distortion of unproductive public expenditures in this model is reflected in the fact
that under lump-sum taxes too much private capital is accumulated relative to public
capital. This disequilibrium is negative for long-run growth, which explains the likely
superiority of distortionary taxation.
Theoretical results in Proposition 2 are easy to show because both types of capital
fully depreciate every period. However, full depreciation is not needed for the qualitative
statements in this proposition. Maintaining the assumption of linear depreciation rates for
both types of capital, it is shown in the Appendix (part 1): (a) there exists a single and
well-defined balanced growth path; (b) the growth-maximizing public investment ratio
under income taxes, κd∗i , is given by (4.1) for any δ, δg; (c) the result in Proposition 2
remains valid: the κc-threshold, κγc , for any δg ∈ [0, 1] and δ = 1 is the same as with
δg = δ = 1, while it is higher13 than that value when δ ∈ [0, 1).
4.2. Maximizing welfare
We now extend the analysis to discuss the possibility that the maximum level of welfare
might be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes. Given κc ≥ 0 andK0,Kg0 > 0,
we assume that the government chooses κi to maximize the welfare of the representative
household over the set of π-CE allocations. Since under full depreciation of both types of
capital the economy displays no transition, the problem reduces to choosing κi such that,
max
0≤κi≤1
V (C0, γ¯) =
·
1
1− β lnC0 +
β
(1− β)2 ln(1 + γ¯)
¸
, (4.5)
subject to either (3.16) and (3.26) under income taxes or to (3.22) and (3.28) under
lump-sum taxes. For 0 < β < 1, V (C0, γ¯) is strictly concave and bounded and the choice
set is convex and compact, so that the optimization problem (4.5) has a single solution.
Moreover, since lim
κi→0+
V = lim
κi→1−
V = −∞, the welfare-maximizing level of κi falls strictly
inside the interval (0, 1).
13So, for given β,α, θ, the range of κc-values leading to higher growth under income taxes is smaller
when private capital depreciation is not complete. A numerical example is also provided in table 6.1.1 in
the appendix (part 1), showing that, in fact, κγc varies very little for δg, δ ∈ [0, 1].
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In fact, the welfare maximizing levels of κi under income taxes, κd+i , and under lump-
sum taxes, κn+i , are given by:14
κd+i = βθ(1− κc) = βκd∗i , (4.6)
κn+i =
βθ
1− β(1− θ) (1− κc − αβ) =
βθ
1− β(1− θ)κ
n∗
i , (4.7)
with κd∗i and κn∗i being the growth-maximizing investment ratios defined in (4.1) and
(4.2).
Since βθ
1−β(1−θ) < 1, the growth-maximizing public investment/output ratio is strictly
higher than the welfare-maximizing ratio under both tax rules,15 the diﬀerence between
them being larger under the less distorting tax system. Under income taxes, the level of
κd+i diﬀers from κd∗i by the factor β, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), since the public
capital stock only becomes productive next period and so the representative household
discounts the positive eﬀect of public investment on welfare by β. Under lump-sum taxes,
the discrepancy between κn∗i and κn+i , measured by βθ1−β(1−θ) , is smaller than β, but it
increases with β and θ. The welfare-maximizing productive public investment ratio is
higher under income than under lump-sum taxation for κc > κ˜c = 1− α1−θ .16
To discuss conditions under which welfare could be higher under income than under
lump-sum taxes, we evaluate (4.5) under κi = κn+i and under κi = κd+i , to obtain
maximized levels of welfare V n and V d, respectively. Their diﬀerence, D = V n − V d, can
be written as17
(1− β)D(ω) = ln
µ
1− β
1− αβ
¶
+
1− β(1− θ)
1− β ln
·
1− κc − αβ
1− β(1− θ)
¸
(4.8)
− 1
1− β ln (1− κc)−
1− θβ
1− β ln (1− βθ) ,
where D(ω) is defined on Ω.
Even though there is no possibility of finding explicit conditions implyingD(ω) < 0, for
given values of α,β, θ, Proposition 3 guarantees existence of a single positive threshold
κvc for the non-productive investment ratio, above (below) which taxing the income of
productive factors is welfare-superior (-inferior) to taxing lump-sum. Lemmas 1 and 2
show two intermediate results.
14See Appendix (part 2). Along the paper, a “+” uppercase denotes a value obtained under a welfare-
maximizing public investment strategy.
15κd+i and κd∗i are equal to each other in the no-spillover model of Barro (1990), while κd+i < κd∗i in
Futagami et al. (1993) and in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994).
16Since κd+i > κn+i for κc > 1 − α1−θ , we will have equality between κ
d+
i and κn+i when κc = 0
and α = 1 − θ (i.e., no spillover in the productive process). Precisely under these conditions, Corsetti
and Roubini (1996) show that the welfare-maximizing public investment ratio is independent of the tax
system considered in a standard Barro-type framework.
17See Appendix (part 2) for more details on this point.
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Lemma 1. D (0;α,β, θ) > 0 for any α,β, θ in Ω.
Proof. See Appendix (part 3)
Lemma 2. For any given values α0,β0, θ0 in (0, 1) with α0 + θ0 ≤ 1, the function h(κc)
defined by h(κc) = D(κc,α0,β0, θ0) in (4.8) is concave, and has a single maximum at
κ˜c = 1− α01−θ0 .
Proof. It is easy to see from (4.8) that, given α0,β0, θ0 in Ω, h(κc) is diﬀerentiable,
the single solution to ∂h/∂κc = ∂D(κc;α0,β0, θ0)/∂κc = 0 is κ˜c = 1 − α01−θ0 , and
∂2D(κc;α0,β0, θ0)/∂κ2c |κc=κ˜c< 0
Proposition 3. There is a critical value of κc, κvc ∈ (κ˜c, 1− αβ), so that income taxes
are a preferred alternative to lump-sum taxes from the point of view of welfare if and only
if κc > κvc .
Proof. (a) D(ω), defined by (4.8) is continuous in Ω; (b) we have seen in Lemma 1 that
D (0;α,β, θ) > 0 for any α,β, θ inΩ, while Lemma 2 shows that κ˜c = argmaxD (κc;α, β, θ),
so that D (κ˜c;α, β, θ) > 0; (c) at the highest feasible value of κc, lim
κc→(1−αβ)−
D(ω) = −∞.
Therefore, there exists a single and well-defined threshold for κc, κvc ∈ (κ˜c, 1− αβ), such
that D(ω) < 0 for any κc > κvc
Corollary 2 shows that κvc declines with α, the output elasticity of private capital. We
also show that there is a threshold θ∗, such that κvc declines with the output elasticity of
public capital θ, provided θ > θ∗. For standard parameterizations, the implied value of θ∗ is
low enough so that we can safely consider ∂κvc/∂θ < 0. Finally, a numerical exploration
shows that κvc declines with β when this parameter is close to one, as considered in
standard calibrations. This should be expected, since (4.5) shows that as β approaches
1, maximizing long-run growth and maximizing welfare become equivalent. These results
suggest that, as it was the case when comparing growth, high levels of β, α and θ increase
the likelihood that taxing total income could be a welfare-superior alternative to taxing
lump-sum.
Corollary 2. κvc is inversely related to α, while ∂κvc/∂θ < 0 for θ ∈ (max {0, θ∗} , 1−α],
with θ∗ = − κc−β(1−α)β(2−κc−αβ) , and ∂κ
v
c/∂θ > 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix (part 4)
Corollary 3 shows that κd+i needs to be bigger than κn+i for the maximum level of
welfare to be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes, which is a condition similar
to that found when comparing growth rates.
Corollary 3. A necessary condition for maximum welfare to be larger under income than
under lump-sum taxes is that the welfare-maximizing public investment ratio be higher
under income than under lump-sum taxes.
Proof. Let us assume that maximum welfare is larger under income than under lump-
sum taxes. Then, by Proposition 3, κc > κvc . But κvc > κ˜c, so that κc > κ˜c, which
implies, from (4.6) and (4.7), κd+i > κn+i
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Lack of transitional dynamics allows us to write welfare as in (4.5), a combination
of initial consumption and long-term growth. In fact, in choosing one versus the other
tax system, we are trading-oﬀ current versus future consumption. Taxing income from
productive factors disincentives private capital accumulation and reduces long-run growth,
with a moderate immediate consumption sacrifice. Alternatively, lump-sum taxation
produces an important consumption sacrifice initially, to the possible benefit of higher
long-term growth. From (3.26), (3.28), we have, under the welfare-maximizing public
investment ratios,
Cd+0
Cn+0
=
(1− αβ) (1− κc) (1− βθ)
(1− β) (1− κc − αβ)
[1− β (1− θ)] , (4.9)
from which it is not hard to show that initial consumption is always higher under distor-
tionary taxation.18 In fact, for standard parameterizations, initial consumption can easily
be ten or twenty times bigger under income taxes than under lump-sum taxes, even for
low κc-ratios.
On the other hand, for small levels of the non-productive public expenditure ratio
κc, growth is higher under non-distortionary taxes and there are two competing eﬀects
in (4.5). As we saw in the previous section, it is when κc increases that growth may
become higher under distortionary taxation. Hence, any condition favoring higher growth
under income taxes will also tend to induce that distortionary taxation might be preferred
from the point of view of welfare. In fact, if growth ever gets higher under distortionary
taxation, it is clear from (4.5) that this type of taxes will also be preferred in terms of
welfare.
In particular, we have already seen that higher output elasticities of either type of
capital attenuate the negative eﬀects of the disincentive to accumulate capital, making
more likely that long-run growth may be higher under distortionary than under non-
distortionary taxation. It is therefore not surprising that they also favor that maximum
welfare may be higher under distortionary taxation. Finally, maximizing welfare amounts
to maximizing long-run growth for high values of β, so that an increase in the value of
β in that range increases the likelihood that distortionary taxation may lead to a higher
level of welfare.
4.3. A numerical illustration
The purpose of this section is to illustrate some of the main findings discussed above with
some numerical examples. Specifically, for alternative calibrations (i.e., specific values for
β, α and θ), we find the solutions to D(κc;β,α, θ) = 0 and Ψ(κc;β,α, θ) = 0. Assuming
annual data, four alternative parameterizations (bench1, bench2, bench3 and bench4) are
considered in table 4.1, all of them sharing a value β = 0.99. In bench1, we assume a
standard parametrization: α = 0.4, θ = 0.15 so that φ = 1− α− θ = 0.45.
18Which is easy to see when κc = 0. Since the ratio of initial consumptions is increasing in κc, the
general result follows.
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Relative to bench1, bench2 is a small variation, with α = 0.75. This parameterization
agrees with a broad interpretation of aggregate capital in the private producing process,
Kt including human and physical capital [see Romer (1987)]. In bench3 we consider the
possibility of a technology intensive in productive public capital by setting θ = 0.35 [close
to the value estimated in Aschauer (1989)], and α = 0.4, as in bench1. Finally, bench4
assumes a high productive technology in both types of capital, with α = 0.7 and θ = 0.3,
implying absence of spillover eﬀects.
For each parameterization considered in table 4.1, table 4.2 shows numerical values
for: (i) the two thresholds: κγc and κvc , the zeroes to Ψ(ω) and D (ω), (ii) for κc = κγc , the
growth-maximizing public investment/output ratio under income taxes [κd∗i from (4.1)]
and the level of κn∗i under lump-sum taxes (4.2), and (iii) for κc = κvc , the welfare-
maximizing public investment/output ratios under income taxes [κd+i in (4.6)] and under
lump-sum taxes [κn+i from (4.7)].
As expected, both thresholds decrease when we increase α or θ, although it seems that
changes in the elasticity of private capital are more relevant. For instance, from bench1,
the level of κγc decreases from 60.4% to 59.2% when θ increases from .15 to .35, but it
falls down to 24.9% when α is increased from .40 to .75. A similar observation applies to
κvc . The threshold above which growth is higher under distortionary taxation is always
higher than the one above which distortionary taxation leads to higher welfare, so the
latter situation arises more often, as we pointed out in the previous section.
Productive public investment ratios maximizing either growth or welfare under lump-
sum taxes are well below those obtained under distortionary taxation. Finally, under
either tax system, investment ratios maximizing welfare are very similar to those maxi-
mizing long-run growth. Under distortionary taxation, the κi-ratio maximizing welfare
is always below that maximizing growth, the opposite result arising under lump-sum
taxes. This is again due to the fact that initial consumption is higher under distortionary
taxation.
The presence of the spillover externality allows us to change the values of the output
elasticities of private and public capital, α and θ, independently from each other, but
that externality plays a minor role in the model. In fact, the proofs to all results in the
previous section remain valid for the case φ = 0, so long as we maintain the restriction
α+ θ = 1.
5. Conclusions
The superiority of non-distorting versus distorting taxation in endogenous growth economies
has been challenged from diﬀerent perspectives. In particular, it is already well known
that positive taxation on the income of productive factors may be growth and welfare en-
hancing when it corrects a negative externality in the competitive equilibrium allocation.
Along this line, we have shown that existence of a significant level of non-productive
public investment, as a percentage of output, is a suﬃcient condition for income taxes to
lead to higher long-run growth and welfare than lump-sum taxes. Specifically, we have
characterized a threshold for the unproductive public expenditure/output ratio, above
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(below) which taxing productive factors’ income results in a welfare-superior (inferior)
financing alternative to taxing lump-sum. The higher the output elasticities of public and
private capital, the lower the threshold for the unproductive public expenditure/output
ratio, favoring income taxes to be preferred to lump-sum taxes for steady-state growth
and welfare.
A given level of non-productive public expenditures works as a negative externality,
which is more damaging under non-distortionary taxation. In that case, accumulation of
private capital is stronger because the return on capital is not being taxed. As a con-
sequence, less resources are left for public investment, which limits the scope for future
growth. A higher time discount factor increases the desire to accumulate capital, inten-
sifying the eﬀect of this externality and making more likely that distortionary taxes may
be preferred to lump-sum taxes.
Welfare analysis has been relatively easy to make under the assumption that both
types of capital fully depreciate every period. This assumption allows us to solve for
the competitive equilibrium analytically, although in a framework too simple to establish
strong policy recommendations. Regarding long-run growth, we have shown that full
depreciation is not determinant for the qualitative and quantitative conclusions, since the
analysis is of the steady-state type. Less than full depreciation in public and private
capital would alter the model significantly, since the steady-state would no longer be
reached in just one period. Welfare analysis then requires a full characterization of the
transitional dynamics, which can only be done through numerical solution methods. That
would be an interesting extension of this paper.
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6. Appendix:
6.1. Part 1: Partial depreciation of capital stocks
Conditions (3.10) and (3.13) can be jointly written,
γ¯ = β [(1− δ) + (1− τ¯)r¯]− 1, (6.1)
with τ¯ = 0 under lump-sum taxes and τ¯ = κi + κc under income taxes.
Using this together with (3.3)-(3.6), which are valid under either tax system, we get,
Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= z
¡
k¯g
¢θ−1 ¡κi − βα(1− τ¯)k¯g¢+ 1− δg − β(1− δ) = 0, (6.2)
whose positive roots are potential candidates to be steady-state values of k¯g. Since Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
is continuous and decreasing in k¯g, with lim
k¯g→0+
Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= +∞ and lim
k¯g→+∞
Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= −∞,
there exists a single k¯g > 0 such that Φ
¡
k¯g
¢
= 0, which defines the steady-state of the
economy.
Lemma 3. Under either tax system, the steady-state level of k¯g is inversely related to
the productive public investment ratio κi.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to the {2-mapping Φ(·) and using the
fact that under income taxes τ¯ = κi + κc, we get,
∂k¯gd
∂κi
= −
∂Φ
¡
k¯gd
¢
/∂κi
∂Φ
¡
k¯gd
¢
/∂k¯gd
=
1 + βαk¯gd
(1− θ) 1
k¯gd
κi + αβθ(1− κi − κc)
> 0, (6.3)
while under lump-sum taxes,
∂k¯gn
∂κi
= −
∂Φ
¡
k¯gn
¢
/∂κi
∂Φ
¡
k¯gn
¢
/∂k¯gn
=
1
(1− θ) 1
k¯gn
κi + αβθ
> 0 (6.4)
We prove next that, under income taxes, expression (4.1) for the growth-maximizing
ratio κd∗i = θ(1− κc) remains valid for any δ, δg ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 4. Under income taxes, the growth-maximizing ratio is κd∗i = θ(1−κc) for any
δ, δg ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. From (3.4) and (3.3) we get: lim
κi→0
γ¯ = −δg < 0 and lim
κi→1−
γ¯ = −κcz
¡
k¯gd
¢θ −
c¯− δ < 0, so that positive values of γ¯ can be attained only for values of κd∗i in the open
interval (0, 1). Taking derivatives in (3.4) and combining
∂γ¯
∂κi
= z
¡
k¯gd
¢θ−2µ
k¯gd − κi(1− θ)
∂k¯gd
∂κi
¶
= 0, (6.5)
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with (6.3) implies κd∗i = θ(1− κc) for any δ and δg
The qualitative result in Proposition 2 holds for δg < 1. The κγc -threshold is the same
as that characterized in the proposition, so long as δ = 1. If δ < 1, the κγc -threshold is
higher than that in Proposition 2.
Lemma 5. There is a critical value of κc, κˆγc , above (below) which the maximum achiev-
able growth rate is higher (lower) under income than under lump-sum taxes. For any
δg ∈ [0, 1] and δ = 1, this κc-threshold is the same as with δg = δ = 1, while it is higher
than that value when δ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. Since the growth rate under lump-sum taxes is increasing in κi for any δg, δ ∈
[0, 1], the highest feasible growth rate that can be achieved under lump-sum taxes is again
obtained for a productive investment ratio of κn∗i , the level of κi implying c¯n = 0. Let
us denote by κˆγc the κc-threshold above which the maximum growth rate under income
taxes becomes higher than growth under κn∗i , and by k¯gd∗, k¯gn∗, the steady-state values
of the K¯gt /K¯t ratio obtained under κd∗i ,κn∗i , the growth maximizing investment policies
under income and lump-sum taxes, respectively, when κc = κˆγc .
Thus, by definition, κˆγc , κn∗i , k¯gd∗ and k¯gn∗ must verify: (1) Φ(k¯gd∗) = 0 under income
taxes for κi = κd∗i , (2) Φ(k¯gn∗) = 0 under lump-sum taxes for κi = κn∗i , (3) c¯n = 0 under
lump-sum taxes for κi = κn∗i , and (4) for κc = κˆγc , the growth rate obtained under κd∗i ,
must be equal to the upper bound on growth rates under lump-sum taxes, i.e., the growth
rate that would be obtained under κn∗i .
These conditions reduce to:
z
¡
k¯gd∗
¢θ−1
(1− κˆγc )
£
θ − βα(1− θ)k¯gd∗
¤
+ 1− δg − β(1− δ) = 0, (6.6)
z
¡
k¯gn∗
¢θ−1 ¡κn∗i − βαk¯gn∗¢+ 1− δg − β(1− δ) = 0, (6.7)
(1− κn∗i − κˆγc )z
¡
k¯gn∗
¢θ − κn∗i z ¡k¯gn∗¢θ−1 − δ + δg = 0, (6.8)
κn∗i = θ (1− κˆγc )
µ
k¯gn∗
k¯gd∗
¶1−θ
. (6.9)
Subtracting (6.6) from (6.7) and combining with (6.8),
k¯gn∗
k¯gd∗
= [(1− θ) (1− κˆγc )]
1/θ . (6.10)
Plugging (6.10) into (6.9),
κn∗i = θ (1− θ)
1−θ
θ (1− κˆγc )
1
θ . (6.11)
On the other hand, adding up (6.7) and (6.8),
z
¡
k¯gn∗
¢θ
(1− κn∗i − κˆγc − βα) + (1− β) (1− δ) = 0. (6.12)
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If δ = 1 then, for any δg ∈ [0, 1], we have from (6.12): κn∗i = 1− κˆγc − βα, since k¯gn∗ > 0,
and plugging (6.11) into this relationship, we obtain,
κˆγc − 1 +
βα
1− θ [(1− κˆγc ) (1− θ)]
1−θ
θ
= 0, (6.13)
which has the same roots as the Ψ-function defined in (4.4). Consequently, κˆγc = κγc ,
the same value obtained under full depreciation of both types of capital. Alternatively,
if δ ∈ [0, 1) we would have (1− β) (1− δ) > 0 in (6.12), which implies that, for any
δg ∈ [0, 1], we have κni > 1− κˆγc − βα, and hence κˆγc > κγc
Even though the κγc -threshold changes with the depreciation rate of private capital,
this eﬀect is minor. Table 6.1 summarizes a numerical example for θ = .15, α = .75 and
β = .99. System (6.6)-(6.9) is solved for this calibration to obtain κˆγc , which turns out to
vary just between 24.9% and 25.5% for δg, δk ∈ [0, 1].
6.2. Part 2: The welfare-maximizing public investment ratio
Under income taxes: plugging (3.26) and (3.16) into (4.5), we get the optimization prob-
lem,
max
0≤κi≤1
1
1− β
µ
ln [(1− κi − κc) (1− αβ)] +
+ β
(1−β)θ [lnκi + (1− θ) ln (1− κi − κc)] +∆
¶
, (6.14)
where∆ = β
1−β lnz+
β
1−β (1−θ) ln (αβ)+ln
³
z (Kg0 )
θK1−θ0
´
.Hence, the welfare-maximizing
ratio, κd+i , is the solution to,
−1
1− κd+i − κc
+
β
1− β
µ
θ
κd+i
− (1− θ) 1
1− κd+i − κc
¶
= 0, (6.15)
leading to: κd+i = βθ(1− κc).
In a similar way, under lump-sum taxes: plugging (3.28) and (3.22) into (4.5),
max
0≤κi≤1
1
1− β
µ
ln [(1− κi − κc)− αβ] +
β
(1− β)θ lnκi +∆
¶
, (6.16)
and the welfare-maximizing ratio, κn+i , the solution to
−1
1− κn+i − κc − αβ
+
β
1− βθ
1
κn+i
= 0 (6.17)
is: κn+i = βθ1−β(1−θ) (1− κc − αβ).
GivenKg0 , K0 > 0 as initial conditions, to obtain a closed form for the welfare function
under income taxes, we evaluate (4.5) under κi = κd+i and τ¯ = κc + κd+i , obtaining V d:
V d =
·
1
1− β lnC
d+
0 +
β
(1− β)2 ln(1 + γ¯
d+)
¸
, with
Cd+0 = (1− κc) (1− βθ) (1− αβ)Y0, (6.18)
1 + γ¯d+ = z (1− κc) (βθ)θ [αβ (1− βθ)]1−θ , (6.19)
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so that,
(1− β)V d = ln (1− κc) + ln (1− βθ) + ln (1− αβ) + lnY0 + (6.20)
+
β
(1− β)
½
lnz+ ln (1− κc) + θ ln(βθ)+
+ (1− θ) [ln (αβ) + ln (1− βθ)]
¾
.
Under lump-sum taxes, we evaluate (4.5) under κi = κn+i and τ¯ = 0, obtaining V n:
V n =
·
1
1− β lnC
n+
0 +
β
(1− β)2 ln(1 + γ¯
n+)
¸
, with
Cn+0 =
(1− β) (1− κc − αβ)
1− β(1− θ) Y0, (6.21)
1 + γ¯n+ = z
·
βθ
1− β(1− θ) (1− κc − αβ)
¸θ
(αβ)1−θ , (6.22)
so that,
(1− β)V n = ln(1− β) + ln (1− κc − αβ)− ln (1− β(1− θ)) + lnY0 + (6.23)
+
β
(1− β)
½
lnz+ θ [ln(βθ) + ln (1− κc − αβ)− ln (1− β(1− θ))] +
+ (1− θ) ln (αβ)
¾
.
Finally, from (6.20) and (6.23), it is easy to show that (1− β)
¡
V n − V d
¢
is given by (4.8).
6.3. Part 3: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. From (4.8), we have ∂D(0;α,β,θ)∂α = −β
θβ
(1−αβ)(1−β) < 0 at κc = 0. It suﬃces to show
that for the highest feasible value of α, α = 1 − θ, D(0; 1 − θ,β, θ) = ln
³
1−β
1−(1−θ)β
´
−
1−θβ
1−β ln (1− βθ) > 0, to conclude that D (0;α, β, θ) > 0 for any α, β, θ in Ω.
To show that D(0; 1− θ, β, θ) > 0, let us denote by
f(θ; β) = ln (1− β)− ln [1− β (1− θ)] ; g(θ; β) = 1− βθ
1− β ln (1− θβ) .
We want to show that w(θ;β) ≡ f(θ;β)− g(θ;β) > 0.
Second derivatives are:
∂2f
∂θ2
=
β2
[1− β (1− θ)]2
;
∂2g
∂θ2
=
β2
(1− β) (1− βθ) ,
so that
∂2w
∂θ2
= β2
(1− β) (1− βθ)− [1− β (1− θ)]2
[1− β (1− θ)]2 (1− β) (1− βθ)
.
Since 0 < β < 1 and 0 < θ < 1, we have:
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sgn
µ
∂2w
∂θ2
¶
= sgn
£
(1− β) (1− βθ)− [1− β (1− θ)]2
¤
=
= sgn
£
−βθ2 − 3 (1− β) θ + (1− β)
¤
.
Let us denote: ϕ (θ;β) = βθ2 + 3 (1− β) θ− (1− β), a second degree polynomial in θ for
each given β, with ϕ (0; β) < 0,ϕ (1;β) > 0. Its two roots are given by:
θβ =
−3 (1− β)±
q
9 (1− β)2 + 4β (1− β)
2β
,
where it is clear that θ−β < 0, while it is not hard to show that θ
+
β < 1.
Hence, in the range of feasible values of θ, the [0,1]-interval, the ϕ (θ; β) polynomial
moves from negative to positive, crossing the θ-axis just once. Equivalently, w (θ;β) is
convex between θ = 0 and the positive root, θ = θ+β , and concave to the right of that
point, being diﬀerentiable on [0, 1]. Together with w (0; β) = 0, w (1;β) = 0, w0 (0;β) = 0
and w0 (1;β) < 0, all these conditions imply that w (θ;β) reaches a single local maximum
between θ+β and θ = 1, taking always positive values on the interval [0, 1]
6.4. Part 4: Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. D(ω) in (4.8) defines an implicit function in ω. Since D(ω) ∈ {2 on its domain,
Ω, the implicit function theorem applies. In addition, we know from Lemma 2 that
∂D(ω)/∂κc < 0 for κc ≥ κvc . Hence:
(a) ∂κvc/∂α = −
∂D(ω)/∂α
∂D(ω)/∂κc
< 0, since
∂D(ω)
∂α
= −β κc(1− β) + βθ(1− βα)
(1− αβ) (1− β) (1− κc − αβ)
< 0,
(b) ∂κvc/∂θ = −
∂D(ω)/∂θ
∂D(ω)/∂κc
, with
∂D(ω)/∂θ =
β
1− β ln
·
(1− κc − αβ) (1− βθ)
1− β(1− θ)
¸
.
Let us consider the function h(θ;β,κc,α) = (1−κc−αβ)(1−βθ)1−β(1−θ) − 1. It is easy to verify that:
(i) ∂h(·)/∂θ = (1− κc − αβ)β −2+β(1−β(1−θ))2 < 0 ∀θ, since κc < 1 − αβ and (ii) h(·) has a
single root at θ∗ = − κc−β(1−α)β(2−κc−αβ) < 1− α, which shows the statement of the corollary
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Table 4.1: Alternative benchmark calibrations
bench1 bench2 bench3 bench4
β 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
α 0.40 0.75 0.40 0.70
θ 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.30
φ 0.45 0.10 0.25 0.00
Table 4.2: κc-thresholds under growth and welfare-maximizing policies
bench1 bench2 bench3 bench4
κγc 60.4 24.9 59.2 25.9
κd∗i 5.9 11.3 14.3 22.2
κn∗i 0.0 0.9 1.2 4.8
κvc 60.3 24.3 58.8 24.5
κd+i 5.9 11.2 14.2 22.4
κn+i 0.1 1.4 1.6 6.0
Note: For values of κc above κγc (κvc ), the maximum long-run growth rate (welfare) is
higher under income than under lump-sum taxes. κd∗i and κd+i are the productive public
investment-to-output ratios maximizing growth and welfare, respectively, under income
taxes and for κc = κγc . κn∗i is the supremum of the public investment ratio under lump-
sum taxes for κc = κvc . Growth is monotonic on κi in that case. κn+i is the value of the
ratio maximizing welfare under lump-sum taxes.
Table 6.1: κˆγc (%) under alternative δg, δ ∈ [0, 1]
δg\δ 0 .20 .40 .60 .80 1
0 25.48 25.32 25.20 25.09 24.90 24.90
.20 25.50 25.35 25.20 25.10 25.00 24.90
.40 25.50 25.36 25.21 25.10 25.00 24.90
.60 25.51 25.37 25.22 25.10 25.00 24.90
.80 25.52 25.38 25.24 25.10 25.01 24.90
1 25.53 25.39 25.30 25.10 25.01 24.90
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Fig. 4.1: Growth-maximizing policies under lump-sum and income taxes
γ
feasible growth
rates under
lump-sum
growth under
lump-sum taxes
growth under
income taxes
*nix ix*dix
Feasible xi values under
lump-sum taxes
*dγ
A
Note: κd∗i maximizes γ¯ under income taxes and κn∗i is such that c¯ = 0 under
lump-sum taxes. If κn∗i is located to the left of A, a higher growth rate could be
achieved under income than under lump-sum taxes.
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